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OF SHIBBOLETHS, SENSE AND CHANGING
TRADITION-LAWYER ADVERTISING
INTRODUCTION
The subject of lawyer advertising stirs up a controversy
which some people might consider unwarranted. However,
when restrictions upon lawyer advertising are changed, tradi-
tion is challenged and therefore values are questioned. Con-
temporary American civilization has prompted individual at-
torneys and the organized bar to ponder an issue: have the
traditional restrictions on advertising become an antiquated
habit. This question must be deliberated if the intrinsic and
timeless values of the tradition are to be retained while the
traditional restrictions are changed to conform to the present.
Review and revision of restrictions on lawyer advertising
were caused by the Supreme Court's decision in Bates v. State
Bar of Arizona' which held that the blanket suppression of such
advertising violated the free speech clause of the first amend-
ment.2 Within five weeks of the Bates decision, almost all of the
states had begun to revise their ethical codes and a few states
had even adopted interim rules.3 The Wisconsin Supreme
Court issued an order adopting interim rules for lawyer adver-
tising on December 23, 1977.1
This comment will examine some of the traditional reasons
for the prohibition against lawyer advertising. It will then con-
sider alternative proposals for increasing lawyer exposure with-
out lifting or modifying the ban on advertising by individual
lawyers. The response of the bar to the need and demands for
lawyer advertising and to the Bates decision will be discussed.
Finally, the Wisconsin interim rules, several proposals for per-
manent rules and the problems of regulation and enforcement
will be analyzed.
1. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
2. Id. at 383. The first amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law...
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press .... " U.S. CONST. amend. I. The
protection of free speech has been applied to the states through the fourteenth amend-
ment. See, e.g., Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 413 (1974) (per curiam); Gitlow
v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
3. See A.B.A. Approves Lawyer Advertising Rules, 63 A.B.A.J. 1177, 1178 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as A.B.A. Approves].
4. See WISBAR Newsletter, Dec. 1977, at 3, reprinted in Wis. B. BULL., Dec. 1977.
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I. HIoRICA BACKGROUND AND DEVELOPMENT
While formal restrictions upon lawyer advertising are a rel-
atively modern phenomenon,5 there is evidence that they
evolved from social conceptions traceable to the Jacksonian
Period, the English legal tradition, medieval times and even
the ancient civilizations of Greece and Rome.' Regulation of
attorney conduct existed at an early date in this country
through standards derived from the common law.7 Even before
formal prohibitive rules were adopted, the profession tradition-
ally abstained from advertising in order to protect the public
from potential abuses such as barratry,8 maintenance,9 cham-
perty, 10 fraud and corruption.
Nevertheless, advertising by attorneys was a widespread
practice during the last half of the nineteenth century," when
"[tihere was a feeling that professions were undemocratic and
un-American. 1' 2 Perhaps this break from tradition occurred
because the concept of legal practice as a profession-with
public service as its primary purpose, without the taint of com-
petition for clients-reached a low point just after the Civil
War. 13
Professionalism was revived, however, with the develop-
ment of bar associations." Near the end of the nineteenth cen-
tury, one state supreme court had taken the position that
"[t]he ethics of the legal profession forbid that an attorney
should advertise his talents or his skill, as a shopkeeper adver-
tises his wares."' 5
5. The first time a written prohibitory rule was applied over a wide geographic area
was shortly after 1908 when the ABA adopted the Canons of Professional Ethics. See
Am. JuR. 2d Desk Book 222 (1962).
6. Francis & Johnson, The Emperor's Old Clothes: Piercing the Bar's Ethical Veil,
13 WnU.Awr L.J. 221, 222-25 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Francis & Johnson].
7. Id. at 225.
8. "Barratry" is the "offense of frequently exciting and stirring up quarrels and
suits." BLACK's LAW DiCnoNARY 190 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
9. "Maintenance" is the unauthorized and officious interference in a suit in which
the offender has no interest, by assisting a party with money or advice to prosecute or
defend the action. Id. at 1106.
10. "Champerty" is a bargain by a stranger with a party to a suit, whereby the
stranger undertakes the cost and risk of litigation, receiving part of the proceeds or
subject sought to be recovered if the suit is successful. Id. at 292.
11. See Jeffers, Institute on Advertising Within the Legal Profession-Con, 29
OKLA. L. Ray. 620, 620 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Jeffers].
12. 5 R. PouND, JumspFtuDENc 679 (1959).
13. Id. at 676-78, 691-92.
14. Id. at 692-93.
15. People v. MacCabe, 18 Colo. 186, _ 32 P. 280, 280 (1893).
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By the time Semler v. Oregon State Board of Dental
Examiners"5 was decided, the bar was fairly well organized. In
that case, the Supreme Court discussed the interaction among
public interest, professional interest and advertising: "[T]he
community is concerned in providing safeguards not only
against deception, but against practices which would tend to
demoralize the profession by forcing its members into an un-
seemly rivalry which would enlarge the opportunities of the
least scrupulous."' 7 This passage reflects the fact that when
professional services are involved, advertising poses inherent
risks. The reference to competition presaged similar views es-
poused by Dean Pound and others 8 in later decades. Thus, the
tradition against advertising was grounded upon the impor-
tance of public service as an essential element of professional-
ism and the protection of both the public and the profession.
Some authorities have also noted that restricting lawyer
advertising within very narrow limits should prevent or dimin-
ish the temptation for lawyers to stir up litigation, to make
unwarranted claims of quality and to hold out inducements for
employment by giving illusory assurances of success or client
satisfaction. In addition, the argument has been made that if
advertising were allowed, the legal profession could suffer a loss
of public respect due to the commercialization of the practice
of law. 20
Finally, the tradition against advertising was reinforced by
16. 294 U.S. 608 (1935). Semler, decided prior to the recent trend of consumerism,
upheld a statutory ban upon specific types of advertising by dentists.
17. Id. at 612.
18. See, e.g., Report of Committee on Professional Ethics, Wis. B. BuLL., June
1956, at 66 (Opinion Number 8). The Wisconsin Ethics Committee interpreted number
29 of the Canons of Professional Ethics and quoted Canon 7 in part: "Efforts, direct
or indirect, in any way to encroach upon the business of other lawyers are unworthy of
those who should be brethren at the bar." Id. at 66. See also Comment, Advertising,
Solicitation and Prepaid Legal Services, 40 TENN. L. Rav. 439, 454 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as Comment].
19. See H. DINKER, LEGAL ETmCs 210-15 (1953) [hereinafter cited as DRINKER];
Letter from Harrison Hewitt to Editor (Nov. 23, 1928), reprinted in 15 A.B.A.J. 116
(1929), quoted in E. CHEATHm, CASES AND MATRuALS ON THE LEGAL PROFESSION 525 (2d
ed. 1955).
20. See Comment, supra note 18, at 452-54. For a thorough analysis defining
"commercialization of the practice of law" and its effects, see B. CHRISTENSEN, LAw-
YERS FOR PEOPLE OF MODERATE MEANS 150-59 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
CHRISTENSEN]. The other possible consequences of advertising which are discussed in
this book include misrepresentation, overreaching, provocation of litigation and the
disruption of competitive advantage within the bar. Id. at 140-50.
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other cultural values, such as the institutions of marriage and
the family. These values were threatened by active solicitation
of legal business. Advertising suggesting that divorce was read-
ily available was held to be unethical in People v. Goodrich2'
and In re Schnitzer.2 Both opinions clearly and correctly criti-
cized the misleading nature of the ads. But one who reads the
opinions is left with the distinct impression that any action
which might encourage divorce must be considered intolerable.
While these cases are additional authority for the ban on law-
yer advertising, the attitude displayed in them is overprotec-
tive of the public.?
This cultural attitude, as well as a concern for protecting
both the bar and the public, eventually led to the codification
of restrictions on legal advertising. As early as 1857 Alabama
drafted a code of legal ethics which regulated, but did not
prohibit, advertising.u In 1908 the American Bar Association
adopted the Canons of Professional Ethics2 which came close
to banning advertising completely. Canon 27 prohibited all
self-laudatory communication with the media, reflecting the
belief that the tradition of law as a profession would be of-
fended not only by misleading ads but also by indirect advertis-
ing.2 One court's interpretation of Canon 27 indicated that
self-laudation may have puffery as its consequence with the
result that ethical attorneys would suffer at the hands of un-
scrupulous braggarts.Y
Canon 27 was strictly enforced with respect to both indirect
and misleading advertising.? State v. Willenson2 ' involved a
21. 79 Ill. 148 (1875).
22. 33 Nev. 581, 112 P. 848 (1911).
23. Any relaxation of anti-advertising rules must recognize the potential client's
freedom of choice. It is most unlikely that an ad stating "Divorce Cases Accepted"
(which is otherwise neither false nor misleading) would, by itself, lead a rational
individual to seek a divorce.
24. Francis & Johnson, supra note 6, at 226. In fact, the ABA Canons of Profes-
sional Ethics were based upon a code adopted by the Alabama State Bar Association
in 1887. Preface to ABA CODE OF PROFESsIONAL REsPONsiBImAY at i (1976) [hereinafter
cited as ABA CODE].
25. See AM. JuR. 2d Desk Book 222 (1962).
26. See ABA CANONS OF PtorssioNAL ETmcs No. 27.
27. See In re Rothman, 12 N.J. 528, _ , 97 A.2d 621, 628 (1953).
28. See generally 0. MAnu & R. CLOUoH, DiGnar OF BAR AssoCIATIN ETiCS
OPMONS (1970). Formal opinions of the Wisconsin and Milwaukee Bar Associations,
some of which concern incidents of advertising and solicitation by lawyers, are in-
cluded in this digest. Id. at 520-23.
29. 20 Wis. 2d 519, 123 N.W.2d 452 (1963) (per curiam).
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sign which hung in a window of an attorney's office adjacent
to the window which displayed his shingle. The sign read
"Income Tax" and publicized a tax preparation service per-
formed by the attorney's wife who shared office space with him.
This sharing of office space, together with the misleading ad-
vertising of the wife's sign, was held to be professional miscon-
duct in violation of Canon 27.30 It has also been stated that as
long as membership in the bar is maintained, a lawyer must
continue to follow the anti-advertising rules regardless of any
dual capacity or dual career."
The Canons of Professional Ethics were supplanted by the
Code of Professional Responsibility in 1970.32 Every state has
adopted some version of the Code.? Wisconsin did so on De-
cember 16, 1969.11 The Code of Professional Responsibility con-
sists of interrelated Canons, Ethical Considerations (EC) and
Disciplinary Rules (DR). The Canons are general standards of
professional conduct and the Ethical Considerations represent
specific objectives toward which all lawyers should strive. The
Disciplinary Rules, however, represent mandatory guidelines,
the breach of which subjects lawyers to disciplinary action.5
Disciplinary Rule 2-101(A) states a general proscription of
media advertising:
A lawyer shall not prepare, cause to be prepared, use, or
participate in the use of, any form of public communication
that contains professionally self-laudatory statements calcu-
lated to attract lay clients; as used herein, "public communi-
cation" includes, but is not limited to, communication by
means of television, radio, motion picture, newspaper, maga-
zine, or book."
30. Id at 526-27, 123 N.W.2d at 456-57. See also In re Duffy, 19 App. Div. 2d 177,
242 N.Y.S.2d 665 (1963) (per curiam) (involving a rather large neon sign which did not
qualify as a shingle).
31. See Librarian v. State Bar, 21 Cal. 2d 862, -, 136 P.2d 321, 323 (1943).
Accord, In re Rothman, 12 N.J. 528, 97 A.2d 621 (1953). See also ABA CODE, supra
note 24, DR 2-102(E); DuNKER, supra note 19, at 221. Cf. State v. Willenson, 20 Wis.
2d 519, 529, 123 N.W.2d 452, 458 (1963) (dissenting opinion).
32. The Code was adopted by the House of Delegates of the American Bar Associa-
tion on August 12, 1969, to become effective on January 1, 1970. ABA CODE, supra note
24, at ii. For a thorough discussion of the history and development of Canon 27 before
it was superseded by the Code, see Francis & Johnson, supra note 6, at 226-28.
33. Francis & Johnson, supra note 6, at 231; Heft, American Bar Association Makes
Many Policy Decisions, Wis. B. BuLL., Apr. 1971, at 48.
34. See Wis. Sup. Ct. Order, 43 Wis. 2d lxxv (1969).
35. ABA CODE, supra note 24, Preliminary Statement, at 1C.
36. ABA CODE, supra note 24, DR 2-101(A). In addition, section (C) provides: "A
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The exceptions to this rule did allow for dignified publicity of
qualified legal assistance organizations, provided that no law-
yer was identified by name. Identification of individual attor-
neys was restricted to a few situations where it would be of little
value to a consumer seeking resolution of a particular legal
problem.37
These Disciplinary Rules like their predecessor, Canon 27,
were strictly enforced even in recent years when there has been
increasing pressure on the bar to relax its restrictions upon
advertising.38 In 1971 an attorney mailed announcements to
residents of an area publicizing the opening of his new branch
office there. The new Disciplinary Rule permitted the mailing
of private announcement cards only to lawyers, clients, former
clients, personal friends and relatives." The attorney was cen-
sured because he did not have personal or professional relation-
ships with all of the residents who received notices. The court
also indicated that it would not allow the attorney to publish
a professional announcement in a newspaper of general circula-
tion.40
Attorneys consulting more than just the Disciplinary Rules
of the Code of Professional Responsibility for guidance in this
area are faced with three types of conflict within the applicable
lawyer shall not compensate or give any thing of value to representatives of the press,
radio, television, or other communication medium in anticipation of or in return for
professional publicity in a news item." Id. DR 2-101(C) (footnote omitted).
37. See ABA CODE, supra note 24, DR 2-101(B).
38. For example, the Federal Trade Commission has begun a major investigation
of regulations or policies (established by states or bar associations) which restrain the
inexpensive delivery of legal services. See FTC Opens Industrywide Probe of Restric-
tions on Legal Services, ANrrRusT & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) A-14 (Dec. 22, 1977). In
addition to the plaintiffs in the Bates decision, both the Justice Department and the
Consumers Union have recently attacked the restrictions in court. Consumers Union
of United States, Inc. v. ABA, 427 F. Supp. 506 (E.D. Va. 1976), vacated, 433 U.S.
917 (1977); United States v. ABA, No. 76-1182 (D.D.C., filed June 25, 1976), noted in
ANTrrRUST & TRAWE REG. REP. (BNA) A-1, D-1 (June 29, 1976). See generally Francis
& Johnson, supra note 6; Freedman, Advertising and Solicitation by Lawyers: A Pro-
posed Redraft of Canon 2 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, 4 HOFSTA L. REv.
183 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Freedman]; Hobbs, Lawyer Advertising: A Good
Beginning But Not Enough, 62 A.B.A.J. 735 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Hobbs];
Comment, Bar Restrictions on Dissemination of Information About Legal Services, 22
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 483 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Bar Restrictions]; Note,
Advertising, Solicitation and the Profession's Duty to Make Legal Counsel Available,
81 YALE L.J. 1181 (1972).
39. See ABA CODE, supra note 24, DR 2-102(A) (2), codifying some of the principles
behind former Canon 27.
40. In re Braun, 61 N.J. 119, _ 293 A.2d 186, 188 (1972) (per curiam).
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Code language. Canon 2, the axiomatic norm from which the
Ethical Considerations and Disciplinary Rules concerning law-
yer advertising are derived, 41 states that: "A Lawyer Should
Assist the Legal Profession in Fulfilling Its Duty to Make Legal
Counsel Available."4 But this important duty is necessarily
restricted by the concomitant Disciplinary Rules, which are
mandatory and which generally prohibit public advertising. 3
A second conflict exists between the Disciplinary Rules and
the Ethical Considerations listed under Canon 2. For example,
limitations upon lawyers' rights to advertise are inconsistent
with the statement found in the Ethical Considerations that
"important functions of the legal profession are to educate lay-
men to recognize their problems, to facilitate the process of
intelligent selection of lawyers, and to assist in making legal
services fully available. '4
Lastly, some Ethical Considerations conflict with others.
For example, the goal of facilitating the "intelligent selection
of lawyers" is at odds with the Ethical Consideration that
"[iln the absence of state controls to insure the existence of
special competence, a lawyer should not be permitted to hold
himself out as a specialist," or even as the recipient of special
training, in fields other than admiralty, trademark and patent
law.45 Thus, the Code provides attorneys with anti-advertising
Disciplinary Rules which contradict some of the aspirational
Ethical Considerations. Consequently, the general duty in
Canon 2 of assisting in making legal counsel fully available has
become secondary in the minds of many lawyers.
The Code itself gives the following justification for the strict
rules on advertising:
The traditional ban against advertising by lawyers, which
is subject to certain limited exceptions, is rooted in the public
41. See ABA CODE, supra note 24, Preliminary Statement, at 1C.
42. ABA CODE, supra note 24, Canon 2.
43. See text accompanying notes 36-37 supra.
44. ABA CODE, supra note 24, EC 2-1 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
45. Id. EC 2-14. However, specialization programs do exist in New York, Pennsyl-
vania and Oregon. Lawyers Venture into Advertising Era with Caution and Questions,
63 A.B.A.J. 1065, 1069 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Lawyers Venture]. Specialization
programs also exist in California, New Mexico, Florida, Arizona and Texas. Kindre-
gan, Where Are We Going with Lawyer Advertising?, 62 MASS. L.Q. 41, 46-47 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Kindregan]. Such programs are also being considered in Colo-
rado, Idaho, Minnesota and Nebraska. Id. at 46-47. In addition, some states have
adopted self-designation programs. Steil, The Advertising Issue, Wis. B. BULL., Nov.
1977, at 7 [hereinafter cited as Steil].
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interest. Competitive advertising would encourage extrava-
gant, artful, self-laudatory brashness in seeking business and
thus could mislead the layman. Furthermore, it would inevit-
ably produce unrealistic expectations in particular cases and
bring about distrust of the law and lawyers. Thus, public
confidence in our legal system would be impaired by such
advertisements of professional services. The attorney-client
relationship is personal and unique and should not be estab-
lished as the result of pressures and deceptions. History has
demonstrated that public confidence in the legal system is
best preserved by strict, self-imposed controls over, rather
than by unlimited, advertising."
Recent developments will do much to change the tradi-
tional rules against lawyer advertising and may lessen, or even
eliminate, the conflict between those rules and the other goals
within the Code.
II. THE ARGUMENT FOR ALTERNATIVES
Short of eliminating the general ban on individual lawyer
advertising, there are several other methods of publicizing the
availability of legal services which should be considered. Three
such methods exist at present: institutional advertising, refer-
ral services and legal service plans.
Institutional advertising provides the public with general
information about the legal profession. Usually sponsored by
local bar associations, such advertising has appeared in both
print and electronic media. Institutional advertising has met
with approval provided that it was dignified, educational and
did not involve the identification of particular lawyers.47 In
January of 1977 a three week informational advertising cam-
paign utilizing newspapers, radio and television was conducted
in Peoria County, Illinois.4 A study of the campaign found that
it was successful in achieving high rates of message recall and
46. ABA CODE, supra note 24, EC 2-9 (footnotes omitted).
47. ABA Comm. ON PROFESSioNAL ETmcs, OPINMONS, No. 307 (1962). The opinions
probably have more historical than precedential value. When the old Canons gave way
to revision, it was stated that "[b]ecause the opinions are necessarily interpretations
of the existing Canons, they tend to support the Canons and are critical of them only
in the most unusual case." ABA CODE, supra note 24, Preface, at i.
48. J.E. Haefner, Advertising Effectiveness Study Prepared for the Illinois Bar
Association, A-2 (April 4, 1977). This information is included in materials provided for
a Continuing Legal Education course, entitled Marketing Legal Services, which was
held in Madison, Wisconsin on Feb. 20-21, 1978.
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comprehension and in changing attitudes and intentions for
future behavior. 49 However, institutional advertising provides
only a rather generalized form of exposure. Realistically, it can
only be expected to provide the public with very basic, albeit
useful, information and education. As a means of truly educat-
ing and informing prospective clients, such advertising has in-
herent limitations. 5°
Lawyer referral services are a second alternative to individ-
ually sponsored lawyer advertising. These services try to match
clients with participating attorneys who are available. They are
usually run by local bar associations.' The Wisconsin Bar has
recently established a statewide lawyer referral program. It "is
not intended to supplant or take over existing programs but,
rather, recognizes the importance of making legal services
available to as many consumers of legal services as possible by
serving areas where no programs exist. ' 5 2 Although it is argua-
ble that advertising by individual attorneys will hinder the
operation of referral programs, 3 it is submitted that lawyer
advertising will complement, and not supplant, referral pro-
grams. With respect to the goal mentioned above of making
legal services available to as many consumers as possible, refer-
ral programs should still benefit the public especially when
combined with institutional advertising efforts. 4 On the other
hand, were the proscription against lawyer advertising contin-
ued, referral programs would be inadequate to meet the profes-
sion's obligation to the public:
[I]t must be acknowledged that the [referral] plan has thus
far failed to live up fully to its promise. This may be due in
part to the attitude of the bar toward lawyer referral. Lawyers
have been generally indifferent toward the program, and in
many communities they have been actively hostile to ele-
ments of the plan that are crucial to its vitality.0
49. Id. at A-17. See also Steil, supra note 45.
50. See Bar Restrictions, supra note 38, at 502.
51. See ABA DmECTORY OF LAWYER REFERRAL SERViCEs (1976). The basic operation,
a description and an evaluation of lawyer referral services can be found in CHRISTENSEN,
supra note 20, at 173-204. See generally ABA HANDBOOK OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE
ON LAWYER REFERRAL SERVICE (6th ed. 1968).
52. LaRowe, Lawyer Referral Goes Statewide, Wis. B. BuLL., Dec. 1977, at 9.
53. See Lawyers Venture, supra note 45, at 1069.
54. See Hobbs, supra note 38, at 736. See also Jeffers, supra note 11, at 623-24.
55. CHRISTENSEN, supra note 20, at 173. Cf. ABA CODE, supra note 24, EC 2-15:
"Lawyers should support the principle of lawyer referral systems and should encourage
the evolution of other ethical plans which aid in the selection of qualified counsel."
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These shortcomings have continued through the mid-1970's.'5
Clearly, the referral concept cannot be used to justify restric-
tive rules against lawyer advertising.
A third method of aiding the public in the selection of legal
services is through prepaid or group legal service plans,57 which
have been recognized by both statutory and case law. Pursuant
to federal statute" the Office of Economic Opportunity estab-
lished a program of legal services for low income groups in 1965.
In a series of group legal service cases,59 the Supreme Court has
upheld such plans, acknowledging that the first amendment
protects collective activity which attempts to obtain meaning-
ful access to the courts. 60
Section 256.294 of the Wisconsin Statutes6' specifically au-
thorizes group legal services. It exempts participating attor-
neys from strict compliance with the rules of professional re-
sponsibility which deal with recommending professional em-
ployment and suggesting the need for legal services. 2 In addi-
tion, statewide enrollment of lawyers has recently begun in
Wisconsin for an open panel prepaid legal plan in which a type
of legal insurance is provided to subscribers who have paid a
specified premium to join the plan. 3 The Wisconsin version is
56. See Schuck, Consumer Ignorance in the Area of Legal Services, 43 INS. COUNSEL
J. 568, 569 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Schuck].
57. For a thorough examination of the types of plans and their regulation, see LEGAL
SERVICE PLANS (W. Pfennigstorf & S. L. Kimball eds. 1977). See also ABA RvsFD
HANDBOOK ON PREPAID LEGAL SERVCS (1972); CmIusTE~sEN, supra note 20, at 225-91;
Dunne, Prepaid Legal Services Have Arrived, 4 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as Dunne].
58. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2981 (1970).
59. United Transp. Union v. State Bar of Michigan, 401 U.S. 576, 585 (1971);
UMW v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 222-24 (1967); Brotherhood of R.R.
Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1, 7 (1964), rehearing denied,
377 U.S. 960 (1964); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438-40 (1963). For a discussion
of these cases, see Freedman, supra note 38, at 188-90.
60. This fundamental right is reflected in the ABA CODE, supra note 24, DR 2-
103(C); DR 2-103(D); DR 2-104(A)(3). There are ethical limitations to the right, how-
ever. Id. DR 2-103; DR 2-104. Additional limitations have been imposed by the courts.
See, e.g., Columbus Bar Ass'n v. Potts, 175 Ohio St. 101, 191 N.E.2d 728 (1963) (court
approved of disciplinary action where the union intermediary who advertised the avail-
ability of a particular lawyer was involved in the referral for the purpose of private
gain).
61. Wis. STAT. § 256.294 (1975). This statute has been amended by court order.
Wis. Sup. Ct. Order, 77 Wis. 2d ix (1977); Wis. Sup. Ct. Order, 79 Wis. 2d xi (1977).
62. See Wis. Code of Professional Responsibility, DR 2-103(C); DR 2-104(A)(3)
(1969). The Wisconsin Code can be found at 43 Wis. 2d ix-lxxiv (1969).
63. For a discussion of "open" and "closed" panels, see Dunne, supra note 57, at
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similar to successful plans in Iowa, Arizona, Virginia, Oregon
and New Mexico.64
As mentioned earlier, 5 the present Code allows qualified
legal assistance organizations to publicize the nature and avail-
ability of their legal services provided that individual lawyers
are not identified by name. It is submitted that this advertising
is a primary reason for the significant social and economic
impact66 of prepaid and group legal service plans. However, it
is difficult to conceive of the plans themselves as a bona fide
alternative to advertising by individual attorneys.
In fact, all three alternatives to individual lawyer advertis-
ing (institutional advertising, referral services and prepaid or
group plans) should be seen simply as additional methods by
which the profession can fulfill its duty to make legal counsel
available. If the legal profession is somehow seduced into ana-
lyzing the situation in terms of an either/or proposition, it may
find itself straining without success to meet its obligations.
Even with these alternative forms of lawyer publicity, the ques-
tion still remains: what about the large majority of the public
which does not participate in group'plans, take advantage of
referral services or buy "legal insurance."
III. THE SETTING FOR Bates
For those people who do not benefit from the alternatives
above, it may be difficult to justify continued restraints upon
the dissemination of information helpful in the selection of
legal counsel. The public's attitude toward the bar may well be
tainted by the profession's opposition to union controlled group
legal services and closed panel plans, its support for minimum
fee schedules and the "secret and toothless disciplinary mecha-
nisms which the legal profession has set up to police itself." 7
22-32. Open panel plans allow members the option of choosing any lawyer. In closed
panel plans, members must consult lawyers previously selected. Id. at 22.
64. WISBAR Newsletter, Dec. 1977, at 3, reprinted in Wis. B. BULL., Dec. 1977.
For a detailed account of a successful experiment in the delivery of legal services, see
F. MARKS, R. HALLAuER & R. CLIrrON, THE SHREVEPORT PLAN (1974) (involving an
insurance type plan designed for a labor union's local membership).
65. See text accompanying note 37 supra.
66. See generally L. DEIcTH & D. WEINSTEIN, PaPAm LEGAL SERVICES (1976).
67. Schuck, supra note 56, at 572. The inadequacies and weaknesses of the bar's
disciplinary mechanisms were documented by the Clark Commission, and it is sug-
gested that these mechanisms must be improved if legal advertising is to become a
reality. Id. It has been suggested that the ABA has been conservative in revising its
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One authority has said, "While I appreciate the value of dign-
ity in the profession, these statements. . . do not explain why
it is undignified for a lawyer to advertise, or why a professional
man may not advertise, while a business man may."8
A. Consumer Needs and the Legal Marketplace
Traditionally, a professional is considered to be a public
servant. In order to serve the public, any profession, and the
legal profession in particular, must be readily accessible. How-
ever, the bar has not always manifested an appropriate concern
for this goal of availability. For example, with the increasing
complexity of society, specialization has increased in the prac-
tice of law. Yet the advantages resulting from this trend have
been severely limited because the "supply" of specialized legal
services has not been clearly delineated for the benefit of those
who "demand" them. 9 It has been urged that, if individual
lawyers are to have a significant role in contemporary urban
society, "then the profession must stop thinking solely in terms
of its own traditions and interests and begin to address itself
to the needs and desires of the people it should be serving."70
Besides accessibility, the quality and cost of legal services
also determine the "demand" for lawyers.7 According to ABA
estimates, effective access to legal services is not available to
at least seventy percent of the public. 2 The cost of legal serv-
ices is one cause of this lack of availability which might not be
directly affected by an increase in lawyer advertising. However,
studies by the bar have found that much of the problem is
caused by the public's inability to identify which lawyers are
competent to handle particular problems and its overestima-
tion of the cost involved as well as the ineffectiveness of the
bar's efforts to improve accessibility.73
anti-advertising rules after Bates because it is not "eager now to finance or operate"
an effective disciplinary mechanism. Lieberman, The ABA Misses the Mark onAdver-
tising, Bus. WEEK, Aug. 29, 1977, at 74.
68. Letter from Harrison Hewitt to Editor (Nov. 23, 1928), reprinted in 15 A.B.A.J.
116 (1929), quoted in Francis & Johnson, supra note 6, at 240 n.102.
69. See text accompanying note 45 supra.
70. B. Christensen, Bringing Lawyers and Clients Together 49 (1968) (American
Bar Foundation tentative draft).
71. See Bar Restrictions, supra note 38, at 484-85.
72. See ABA SPECIAL COMM. ON PREPAD LEGAL SERvicEs, A PRimER OF PREPAID
LEGAL SERvICES 7 (1974).
73. See B. CURRAN, THE LEGAL NEEDS OF THE PUBLIC (1977). Other studies and
surveys are listed in the Bates opinion itself. 433 U.S. 350, 370-71 nn.22 & 23. See also
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B. The Response and Reforms of the Bar
Ethical codes of the legal profession must be amended peri-
odically in order to adapt to changes in both the legal system
and society. Sometimes this process takes many years. In re-
sponse to the need for more effective consumer access to legal
services, the ABA acted in 1976 to liberalize the Code to allow
for increased information in the Yellow Pages listings of attor-
neys.75 The changes allowed an attorney to indicate office hours
and other hours of availability, initial consultation fees, the
availability of credit arrangements and that schedules or esti-
mates of fees for specified services were available upon request,
subject to regulation by the local bar.78 However, only a few
states accepted these amendments during the sixteen month
period between their adoption and the Bates decision.77 The
amendments were thought by some to be insufficient.78 Others
suggested that further study was needed to explore possible
further liberalization in order to properly balance the public's
right to information with the potential for abuse. 9
After Bates, the ABA has studied two new proposals, each
representing a substantial departure from the former Discipli-
nary Rules and Ethical Considerations regarding publicity.
Neither proposal, however, would allow person-to-person solic-
itation or the use of television (unless deemed necessary by the
appropriate state authority). 0 Proposal A closely regulates
both the method and content of attorney advertisements,
though it does allow for limited disclosure of fee information.
It also provides for a system in which attorneys could receive
rulings on the use of additional information in individual cases
Dunne, supra note 57, at 6-9; Meserve, Our Forgotten Client: The Average American,
57 A.B.A.J. 1092 (1971).
74. Although recommendations were made as early as 1928 to revise the Canons of
Professional Ethics, the revision was not accomplished until 1970. ABA CODE, supra
note 24, Preface, at i.
75. ABA CODE, supra note 24, DR 2-102(A)(5); DR 2-102(A)(6).
76. Id.
77. See Lawyers Venture, supra note 45, at 1069.
78. See, e.g., Hobbs, supra note 38.
79. See, e.g., Smith, Making the Availability of Legal Services Better Known, 62
A.B.A.J. 855 (1976).
80. For a description and the complete text of both proposals, see House of Dele-
gates Adopts Advertising D.R. and Endorses a Package of Grand Jury Reforms, 63
A.B.A.J. 1234, 1234-37 (1977) [hereinafter cited as House of Delegates]. Both propos-
als were criticized by the Department of Justice. A.B.A. Approves, supra note 3, at
1178.
[Vol. 61:644
COMMENTS
by applying to the appropriate state authorities. Lastly, it pre-
scribes the length of time for which attorneys would be bound
by representations concerning fees." Proposal B adopts a gen-
eral antifraud standard, lists the elements of prohibited false,
fraudulent, misleading or deceptive statements and specifies
improper forms of public communication. 82 Members of the
ABA Task Force on Lawyer Advertising disagreed on which
proposal to recommend. One felt that only Proposal A would
be enforceable and provide a predictable standard for lawyers
who want to advertise. Another expressed his view that only
Proposal B is likely to free bar associations "from continuous
litigation on this subject." 3 The ABA adopted Proposal A and
amended the Code, but it voted to circulate both proposals to
the states for consideration by local authorities. 4 The ABA also
authorized the creation of a Commission on Advertising to
monitor developments and make recommendations for improv-
ing the ABA guidelines and a special committee to consider a
program of nationwide institutional advertising. s5
C. Decisions Leading Up To Bates
The Bates decision itself was decided only after several sig-
nificant developments in the areas of first amendment rights
and antitrust law. That the first amendment could limit the
power of the bar to restrict advertising was demonstrated in the
group legal services cases.8" However, commercial advertising
had been virtually excluded from first amendment protection
ever since the Supreme Court's decision of Valentine v.
Chrestensen" in 1942. Chrestensen had upheld a municipal
ordinance prohibiting the distribution of commercial advertis-
ing matter in the streets of New York City.8
The Chrestensen holding was rather broadly applied until
1975 and the case of Bigelow v. Virginia."8 In that case the
Supreme Court decided that Chrestensen should not be inter-
81. House of Delegates, supra note 80, at 1235-36.
82. Id. at 1236-37.
83. A.B.A. Approves, supra note 3, at 1178.
84. House of Delegates, supra note 80, at 1234.
85. Summary of Action Taken by the House of Delegates of the American Bar
Association 30 (Aug. 8-10, 1977).
86. See text accompanying note 59 supra.
87. 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
88. Id. at 54.
89. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
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preted to mean that "advertising is unprotected per se.""° The
right of free speech could not be narrowed merely because com-
mercial activity was involved. The Court adopted a balancing
test to determine the constitutionality of a state law or local
ordinance regulating commercial advertising. This test
weighed the public interest allegedly protected by the regula-
tion against the restriction of first amendment rights."
In Bigelow the defendant had been convicted of violating
the Virginia anti-abortion statute because he had published an
ad which offered to arrange for a legal abortion in another state.
The Court applied the balancing test and reversed the convic-
tion, noting that "the advertisement conveyed information of
potential interest and value to a diverse audience. 9 2 After
Bigelow, commercial speech found to contain information of
clear public interest could not constitutionally be prohibited
absent a compelling state interest. 3
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Con-
sumer Council, Inc. 4 applied this rule for the first time to the
regulation of professional conduct. It struck down a state stat-
ute prohibiting the advertisement of prescription drug prices
by licensed pharmacists. The Court noted that, while subject
to some forms of regulation, commercial speech was protected
by the first amendment. 5 However, the Court expressly recog-
nized the difference between the statute in Virginia Pharmacy
and other rules regulating professional conduct:
We stress that we have considered in this case the regula-
tion of commercial advertising by pharmacists. Although we
express no opinion as to other professions, the distinctions,
historical and functional, between professions, may require
90. Id. at 819-20 (footnote omitted).
91. Id. at 826-29.
92. Id. at 822.
93. Before Bigelow, whether or not particular types of advertisements were found
to be "speech" entitled to constitutional protection apparently depended upon the
extent to which the advertising was informative or purely competitive. See generally
Annot., 37 L. Ed. 2d 1124 (1974). Compare Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n
on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973) (describing help-wanted ads as classic exam-
ples of commercial "speech") and Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 300 F.
Supp. 1036 (C.D. Cal. 1969), affl'd, 397 U.S. 728 (1970) (holding that a statute prohibit-
ing pandering advertisements in the mails was constitutional) with New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (finding that a paid political advertisement was
not commercial "speech").
94. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
95. Id. at 761-70.
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consideration of quite different factors. Physicians and law-
yers, for example, do not dispense standardized .products;
they render professional services of almost infinite variety
and nature, with the consequent enhanced possibility for con-
fusion and deception if they were to undertake certain kinds
of advertising."
In his concurring opinion, Chief Justice Burger pointed out
that the states have broad powers of regulation over the prac-
tice of law.97 The Court did not want to consider the constitu-
tionality of restrictions on individual lawyer advertising when
the issue was not directly presented.
Meanwhile, the application of the general bar proscription
against lawyer advertising was being successfully challenged in
several cases involving fact situations which also did not di-
rectly raise the individual lawyer advertising issue. In Jacoby
v. State Bar of California," attorneys who founded a low cost
legal clinic were charged with violating the disciplinary rule
against advertising and solicitation. They had cooperated with
the news media in publicizing information about the clinic.
Applying the Bigelow rationale, the California Supreme Court
held that the disciplinary rule could not constitutionally be
applied in this case, where the publicity was in reference to a
newsworthy topic, even though the lawyers became subjects of
the publicity.99
In another case, Consumers Union of the United States, Inc.
v. ABA, 00 a federal district court held that attorneys could not
be disciplined for allowing the publication of a consumer law
list" containing information concerning their services. The
list, compiled as an experiment by the Consumers Union, pro-
vided the names of attorneys practicing in Arlington County,
Virginia, along with basic information about their initial con-
sultation fees, clientele, experience in particular areas of law,
fields of concentration and continuing legal education.1 12 The
96. Id. at 773 n.25 (emphasis in original).
97. Id. at 774.
98. 19 Cal. 3d 359, 562 P.2d 1326, 138 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1977).
99. Id. at -, 562 P.2d at 1333-34, 1340, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 84-85, 91.
100. 427 F. Supp. 506 (E.D. Va. 1976), vacated, 433 U.S. 917 (1977) (remanded to
be reconsidered in light of Bates).
101. Traditionally law lists have been provided only for the benefit of other attor-
neys or for corporate clients. Bar Restrictions, supra note 38, at 501.
102. Under the temporary advertising guidelines proposed by the Board of Gover-
nors of the State Bar of Wisconsin, all of these items of information (with the possible
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district court decision emphasized that the overbroad applica-
tion of the disciplinary rule in this case unduly restricted the
publisher's rights to gather and disseminate consumer informa-
tion. 0 1
A more direct challenge to the bar's power to restrict indi-
vidual lawyers' rights to advertise is presented in Marine v.
State Bar of Wisconsin.'"4 The pleading alleged that the State
Bar of Wisconsin had commenced an inquiry into the plaintiff-
attorney's newspaper advertisements publicizing his availabil-
ity as a divorce lawyer. The federal district court denied an
injunction against enforcement of the anti-advertising discipli-
nary rule and, as of this writing, has heard motions to dismiss
the action.'" 5
Other challenges to bar restrictions on advertising have
arisen in the antitrust field. Although the cases in this area
deal with the application of the Sherman Antitrust Act,"'0 they
involve some of the same considerations raised in the first
amendment cases mentioned above. 07 The threshold issue in-
volved in the antitrust cases is whether the bar rules against
advertising constitute "state action," which is not subject to
the provisions of the Sherman Act. This state action exemption
was established in Parker v. Brown' and was held to apply to
all state officials acting under color of law.' The exemption
was later extended to include private conduct compelled by the
action or direction of the state."0 Some writers have argued
exception of continuing legal education courses, which are not specifically mentioned),
along with many others, could be listed in approved legal directories. Supreme Court
Hearing: Amendment to the Code of Professional Responsibility, Wis. B. BULL., Oct.
1977, at 42 [hereinafter cited as Supreme Court Hearing] (reprinting the Board's
petition to the Wisconsin Supreme Court, including its proposed guidelines).
103. 427 F. Supp. at 523. The court noted that "[w]ith the exception of the use
of specialization labels, there is very little nonfee information that can be justifiably
prohibited." Id. at 521-22.
104. No. 76-C-373 (E.D. Wis., filed May 28, 1976).
105. Letter from John B. McCarthy, Administrator of the Board of Attorneys Pro-
fessional Responsibility, to Thomas E. Skowronski (Feb. 28, 1978). The Board was only
recently established and operates under the auspices of the Supreme Court of Wiscon-
sin. See Wis. Sup. Ct. Order, 74 Wis. 2d ix (1976). See also Wis. Sup. Ct. Order, 81
Wis. 2d xxi, xxiii (1977) (listing procedures for the Board).
106. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970).
107. See generally Note, Price Advertising of Legal Services: The Move Toward a
Balancing Test, 16 WAsHHuRN L.J. 683 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Price Advertising].
108. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
109. Id. at 352.
110. See Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 791 (1975).
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that restrictions on lawyer advertising are likely to be within
the state action exemption because the states have broad regu-
latory powers over the practice of law."' Others argue persua-
sively that the antitrust laws should be applied to the legal
profession, just as any other occupation, at least when the issue
is advertising. 12
In United States v. Gasoline Retailers Association' the
Seventh Circuit held that agreements not to compete through
price advertising are per se violations of the Sherman Act,"'
but under circumstances distinguishable from the lawyer ad-
vertising situation. Products, not services, were involved in
that case and the agreement was between several businesses
and a labor union, not among members of a profession. These
two distinctions have been recognized by the Supreme Court
in the past."5 More recently, however, in Goldfarb v. Virginia
State Bar,"' the Supreme Court struck down the learned pro-
fession doctrine, a supposed blanket immunity for professions
from the Sherman Act.'1 7 The Court did indicate, however, that
professions may be treated differently under the Act."8 More-
over, the practice found to be an unreasonable restraint of
trade in Goldfarb was the enforcement of a minimum fee
schedule through disciplinary action,"' a fact situation not en-
tirely analogous to the enforcement of anti-advertising rules.
The Justice Department is now challenging the American
Bar Association's anti-advertising rules directly under the
Sherman Act. 20 The complaint alleges that the Code, by pro-
111. See, e.g., Morrison, Institute on Advertising Within the Legal Profes-
sion-Pro, 29 OKLA. L. REv. 609, 611 (1976).
112. See, e.g., Francis & Johnson, supra note 6, at 247-71. The balancing test
approach to state action immunity is discussed in Price Advertising, supra note 107,
at 692-701.
113. 285 F.2d 688 (7th Cir. 1961).
114. Id. at 691.
115. See, e.g., United States v. Oregon State Medical Soc'y, 343 U.S. 326, 336
(1952).
116. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
117. Id. at 787.
118. "We . . . recognize that in some instances the State may decide that 'forms
of competition usual in the business world may be demoralizing to the ethical stan-
dards of a profession.'" Id. at 792 (quoting United States v. Oregon State Medical
Soc'y, 343 U.S. 326, 336 (1952)).
119. 421 U.S. at 783-88. For a discussion of the effect of Goldfarb on the prohibition
against advertising and solicitation, see Branca & Steinberg, Attorney Fee Schedules
and Legal Advertising: The Implications of Goldfarb, 24 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 475, 505-21
(1977).
120. United States v. ABA, No. 76-1182 (D.D.C., filed June 25, 1976).
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hibiting availability and price advertising, restricts competi-
tion and deprives consumers of information about legal serv-
ices. ' 2 However, the important issue of state action under the
Sherman Act is not likely to be affected by the result in this
case. Even if the Justice Department is successful, a judgment
against the ABA would not be enforceable against state bar
associations. 22 However, the state exemption issue was directly
presented in Bates, a case brought against the State Bar of
Arizona.
IV. THE Bates DECISION
In 1976 John R. Bates and Van O'Steen were suspended
from the bar for advertising the prices of various services at
their legal clinic. They appealed arguing that DR 2-101(B),1 23
which had been adopted by the Arizona Supreme Court, vio-
lated the Sherman Act and the first amendment of the United
States Constitution. The Arizona Supreme Court reduced the
sanction to formal censure noting that Bates and O'Steen had
advertised "in good faith to test the constitutionality of DR 2-
101(B)," ' ' but it did not reverse the decision and the two attor-
neys appealed to the United States Supreme Court.'25
The issue presented was conceived by the majority of the
Court to be a narrow one: "whether lawyers. . . may constitu-
121. See Justice Department Charges Code Advertising Provisions Violate Federal
Antitrust Laws, 62 A.B.A.J. 979, 980 (1976) (reprinting the text of the complaint in
United States v. ABA); Association Files Answer in Civil Antitrust Suit Brought by
the United States, 62 A.B.A.J. 1179 (1976) (reprinting the answer in United States v.
ABA).
122. See Price Advertising, supra note 107, at 696.
123. DR 2-101(B) reads in part:
A lawyer shall not publicize himself, or his partner, or associate, or any other
lawyer affiliated with him or his firm, as a lawyer through newspaper or maga-
zine advertisements, radio or television announcements, display advertisements
in city or telephone directories, or other means of commercial publicity, nor
shall he authorize or permit others to do so in his behalf.
ABA CODE, supra note 24, DR 2-101(B) (footnotes omitted).
124. In re Bates, 113 Ariz. 394, -, 555 P.2d 640, 646, 648 (1976). The state bar
had recommended a minimum six month suspension as punishment. This had been
reduced to a one week suspension by the Board of Governors of the Arizona State Bar
before the Arizona Supreme Court issued its decision prescribing censure. Id.
125. Widespread interest in the case was demonstrated by the large number of
briefs amicus curiae which were submitted. In support of the Bates and O'Steen
position, briefs were submitted by a council of lawyers, credit and consumer unions
and the Justice Department. Various professional associations and numerous bar asso-
ciations submitted opposing briefs. Sfikas, Supreme Court to Hear Oral Argument in
Arizona Advertising Case, 65 ILL. B.J. 382 (1977).
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tionally advertise the prices at which certain routine services
will be performed.' '2 Thus, the Court did not deal with the
constitutionality of prohibiting claims regarding the quality of
legal services or in-person solicitation and other forms of adver-
tising which were not involved in the Bates case. The Court did
hold that blanket suppression of individual lawyer advertising
violated the free speech clause of the first amendment.
The Court did not grant relief on the antitrust claim, ruling
that the regulation here was protected by the state action ex-
emption. The opinion written by Justice Blackmun distin-
guished decisions, such as Goldfarb and Cantor v. Detroit Edi-
son Co. 27 which had held the exemption inapplicable. The
minimum fee schedule in Goldfarb had not been an affirmative
command of the state supreme court. Cantor had involved sim-
ply a state agency's acquiescence in an anticompetitive pro-
gram of the private party against whom the claim had been
directed. There was no independent state regulatory interest. 28
On the other hand, Bates involved an affirmative regulation by
a state supreme court and claims brought directly against an
agent of that state. The Bates Court emphasized that state
policy had been clearly and affirmatively expressed by the dis-
ciplinary rules and even re-examined by the supervising policy
maker, in this case the Arizona Supreme Court.' 29 Thus, the
promulgation of anti-advertising rules by bar organizations,
without direct involvement by a court or other state agency,
may be subject to the Sherman Act. 3'
The basis of the Bates decision, however, was the first
amendment of the United States Constitution. The Arizona
Supreme Court had held it inapplicable, partly because it
thought that Bigelow did not apply to the regulation of profes-
sionals.'3' However, the United States Supreme Court cited
Bigelow and Virginia Pharmacy when it noted that commercial
speech can serve "individual and societal interests in assuring
informed and reliable decisionmaking," thus playing an indis-
126. 433 U.S. at 367-68 (emphasis in original). Chief Justice Burger and Justices
Powell and Rehnquist dissented.
127. 428 U.S. 579 (1976).
128. 433 U.S. at 359-63.
129. Id. at 362-63.
130. See Bar Antitrust Problems Still Linger Despite Bates, 63 A.B.A.J. 1067
(1977).
131. See In re Bates, 113 Ariz. 394, -, 555 P.2d 640, 644 (1976).
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pensable role within a free enterprise system. 131
Justice Blackmun weighed these substantial interests in the
free flow of commercial information against several proffered
justifications for the advertising ban.13 The Court was reluc-
tant to permit the suppression of information upon the basis
of policy considerations which justify the restraints in only
rather limited ways. For example, it noted that "the postulated
connection between advertising and the erosion of true profes-
sionalism" was "severely strained.' 1 34 The Court also dismissed
the contention that attorney advertising is inherently mislead-
ing, noting that only routine services lend themselves to adver-
tising and that consumers now have the ability to identify gen-
eral types of legal services, an ability that would be enhanced
by advertising. Even if the public could be misled due to its
own naivete, the proper response is for the bar to educate the
public not to place undue emphasis upon advertised informa-
tion.13 The Court also rejected the argument that the freedom
to advertise should be restricted because of the possibility of
increased overhead costs to the profession which would be
passed on to consumers. The majority argued that these con-
siderations were irrelevant to the application of the first
amendment, noting also that restraints on advertising did not
deter the rendition of services of poor quality. 13' The last justifi-
cation posed for the present rules was that regulation of adver-
tising, other than by blanket restrictions, would create burden-
some enforcement problems. In rejecting this contention, the
Court indicated what was implicit throughout the Bates opin-
ion, namely, the Court's fundamental faith in the integrity of
the vast majority of lawyers. 3 '
This faith was implicit in the only portion of the opinion in
which the Court discussed possible future regulation of lawyer
advertising: "Unethical lawyers and dishonest laymen are
likely to meet even though restrictions on advertising exist.
132. 433 U.S. at 364.
133. Id. at 368-79.
134. Id. at 368.
135. Id. at 373-75. Justice Powell objected to the majority's "facile assumptions
that legal services can be classified into the routine and the unique." Id. at 392. Chief
Justice Burger argued that without a definition of routine services, "enormous new
regulatory burdens [would be imposed] . . . on the presently deficient machinery of
the bar and courts .... " Id. at 387.
136. Id. at 378-79.
137. Id. at 379.
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The appropriate response to fraud is a sanction addressed to
that problem alone, not a sanction that unduly burdens a legit-
imate activity."'' 8 Otherwise the Court went no further than to
hold that lawyer advertising is constitutionally protected free
speech.'31 On the other hand, the Court did "not hold that
advertising by attorneys may not be regulated in any way.' 40
Therefore, the profession must develop new regulatory guide-
lines which are consistent with the Bates decision.
V. THE WISCONSIN INTERIM RULES AND PROPOSALS FOR
SUPPLEMENTARY GUIDELINES
On December 23, 1977, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
adopted the following interim rules by court order:
1. For a one year period beginning January 1, 1978, a
lawyer may advertise the lawyer's availability to provide
legal services. It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to use
any advertisement which is false, misleading, or deceptive.
2. Any provision of the Code of Professional Responsibil-
ity to the extent that it conflicts with this order is suspended.
3. Section 256.295 is not suspended by this order and a
violation of that section is professional misconduct.'
In adopting these rules the court chose to follow the more lib-
eral proposals urged by the Center for Public Representation
and other free-speech advocates and declined to follow the
more restrictive guidelines suggested by the Governors of the
State Bar of Wisconsin."' A general antifraud standard was
138. Id. at 375 n.31. See also id. at 373 n.28.
139. Bates and O'Steen had demonstrated that their specific conduct was constitu-
tionally protected. Thus, the Court did not have to rely upon the first amendment
overbreadth doctrine, which has been used to invalidate other regulations which have
a chilling effect on protected free speech. Id. at 379-82. Justice Rehnquist, who re-
garded the free speech clause "as a sanctuary for expressions of public importance or
intellectual interest," would not allow it to reach advertisements of goods and services.
Id. at 404 (dissenting opinion).
140. Id. at 383.
141. Wis. Sup. Ct. Order, 82 Wis. 2d xxvii (1977). This comment will not deal with
proposed revisions of Canon 2 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. For two such
proposals see Freedman, supra note 38, at 198-203; Note, Advertising, Solicitation and
the Profession's Duty to Make Legal Counsel Available, 81 YmX L.J. 1181, 1191-1201
(1972) [hereinafter cited as Advertising]. Both proposals are similar to Wisconsin's
interim approach except that the range of permissible conduct is explained in greater
detail.
142. The guidelines proposed by the Center for Public Representation provided as
follows:
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employed in lieu of the restrictive disciplinary rules of Canon
2. Even though the barratry statute4 1 is retained, written solic-
itation announcing availability or fee information should be
permitted, provided the communication meets the antifraud
standard of the guideline and contains only such information
as is permissible in an advertisement.
This open approach under the interim rules offers a stan-
dard which is less predictable than the former disciplinary
rules, yet clearly consistent with the spirit of Bates. At present
there is little reason to suspect that either Bates or Wisconsin's
interim rules will present serious problems. While one post-
Bates advertiser claimed to be the "World's Most Creative
Section 1. No lawyer, legal firm, legal corporation or legal association, or
agent or employee thereof, shall cause to advertise any announcement, state-
ment, representation or statement of fact which is untrue, deceptive or mislead-
ing.
Section 2. In-person solicitation which does not violate the provisions of
Wisconsin Statute 256.295 is permitted.
Section 3. The charge and method of charging for professional services may
be advertised. In addition, a lawyer may advertise the availability of fee infor-
mation and whether credit cards or other credit arrangements are accepted.
Section 4. Unless permitted by the Wisconsin Supreme Court, no claims
of expertise in any particular field or area of law shall be made. A lawyer or firm
may advertise that his/her or its practice is concentrated in certain fields or
areas of practice.
Section 5. Any particular field or area of the law which a lawyer or firm
does not wish to undertake may be specified.
Section 6. Lawyer or law firm, as used herein, means a lawyer, legal firm,
legal association or legal corporation.
Petition to the Wis. Sup. Ct. (presented Nov. 28, 1977).
The alternative proposal of the Board of Governors of the State Bar of Wisconsin
is reprinted in Supreme Court Hearing, supra note 102, at 42.
143. Barratry. (1) SOLICITING LEGAL BUSINESS. It shall be unlawful for any
person to solicit legal matters or a retainer, written or oral, or any agreement
authorizing an attorney to perform or render legal services.
(2) SOLICITATION OF A RETAINER FOR AN ATTORNEY. It shall be unlawful for any
person to communicate directly or indirectly with any attorney or person acting
in his behalf for the purpose of aiding, assisting or abetting such attorney in the
solicitation of legal matters or the procurement through solicitation of a retain-
er, written or oral, or any agreement authorizing the attorney to perform or
render legal services.
(3) EMPLOYMENT BY ATTORNEY OF PERSON TO SOLICIT LEGAL MATTERS. It shall
be unlawful for an attorney to employ any person for the purpose of soliciting
legal matters or the procurement through solicitation of a retainer, written or
oral, or of any agreement authorizing the attorney to perform or render legal
services.
(4) PENALTY. Any person guilty of any violation of this section shall be
imprisoned not more than 6 months or fined not exceeding $500.
Wis. STAT. § 256.295 (1975).
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Lawyer," bar officials in most parts of the country report no
complaints about the small number of ads they have seen.I"
Although enforcement problems are possible, there is no reason
to assume that more than a very small percentage of attorneys
will be indiscreet, misleading or deceptive in their advertising.
Furthermore, Wisconsin already has several other laws regulat-
ing advertising in general which could be applied to the adver-
tising practices of attorneys."' Should more detailed guidelines
defining examples of false, misleading or deceptive conduct"'
prove to be necessary in the future, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court 47 can always incorporate more explicit provisions into
the interim rules at that time.
However, there is a need for two additional guidelines in the
Wisconsin interim rules to guard against possible abuses of the
right to advertise and to guarantee that the new rules accur-
ately reflect the liberal spirit of the Bates decision. Though the
majority in Bates preferred to construe the issue narrowly as
applying only to price advertising, the decision was based upon
the broad first amendment protection of all commercial speech
in which the public has an interest. The Court stated that
"people will perceive their own best interests if only they are
144. See Lawyers Venture, supra note 45, at 1066.
145. See Wis. STAT. §§ 100.18, 100.20 (1975) (dealing with fraudulent advertising
and methods of competition and trade practices respectively. Section 100.18 expressly
applies to advertisement of services. Both statutes are drafted in rather general terms
and would seem to be applicable to the learned professions. It is also possible that the
Department of Agriculture, Trade and Consumer Protection, to which the state legisla-
ture has delegated the authority to enforce these statutes, would have concurrent
authority with the Wisconsin Supreme Court in the regulation of lawyer advertising.
However, "[a]s a matter of policy . . . and in recognition of the traditional role of
the supreme court, . . . [the Department] would normally plan on referring routine
problems and complaints concerning lawyer advertising and conduct to the state bar
. ... Letter from Attorney James K. Matson to Ms. Linda Berler of the Center for
Public Representation (Dec. 20, 1977).
146. See, e.g., House of Delegates, supra note 80, ABA Proposal B; DR 2-101(B),
DR 2-101(C), at 1236. Standards for lawyer advertising might also be developed from
the opinions of the Federal Trade Commission, which has ruled on a wide variety of
deceptive advertising cases since 1914. Advertising, supra note 141, at 1197. See also
Developments in the Law-Deceptive Advertising, 80 HARv. L. Rav. 1005, 1019-27,
1038-63 (1967).
147. The Wisconsin Supreme Court has the authority to adopt Disciplinary Rules
for the legal profession as part of its implied power to regulate attorneys. See Wis.
CONsT. art. VII, §§ 2, 3; In re Cannon, 206 Wis. 374, 240 N.W. 441 (1932). The court
has recently issued procedures for the Board of Attorneys Professional Responsibility.
See Wis. Sup. Ct. Order, 81 Wis. 2d xxi. The Wisconsin courts also have the authority
to preside over disciplinary actions brought against lawyers. See Wis. STAT. § § 256.283,
256.29(2) (1975).
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well enough informed, and. . . the best means to that end is
to open the channels of communication rather than to close
them." 4 ' For the most part, the Wisconsin interim rules are in
line with this policy of unhampered communication, but the
third paragraph of the rules could be interpreted to unduly
restrict the free flow of information. To eliminate the possibil-
ity that the anti-barratry statute be used to defeat the purpose
of the liberalized rules, the following guideline is suggested:
To the extent that the communication is not false, mislead-
ing, or deceptive, a lawyer may distribute or mail written
announcements of availability or fee information unless or
until the recipient thereof notifies4' the lawyer that receipt
of such information is not desired.
Oral solicitation is not included in the proposed supplementary
guideline on the theory that communications of this nature,
which are not recorded in any manner, are more likely to in-
volve the problems of deception and frivolous claims of decep-
tion.
This expansion of protection to virtually all written commu-
nications is warranted by the Bates decision despite its ostensi-
bly narrow holding. In dissent in that case Justice Powell noted
that "today's decision cannot be confined on a principled basis
to price advertisements in newspapers. No distinction can be
drawn between newspapers and a rather broad spectrum of
other means-for example, magazines, signs in buses and sub-
ways, posters, handbills, and mall circulations.""'5 Applying
this reasoning to the Wisconsin rules, section 256.295 of the
Wisconsin Statutes should not be used to prohibit the distribu-
tion of information which would be permitted in public adver-
tisements simply because it is intended to be directed to an
individual member of that public.
In order to ensure the integrity of information that does
reach the public, a second specific guideline relating to publi-
cized fees should also be included in the Wisconsin interim
rules. Under the present rules a lawyer can advertise a specific
fee for a "routine service," without a disclaimer, only to raise
the fee during the initial consultation.
148. 433 U.S. at 365 (quoting Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976)).
149. For a discussion of the notice requirement, see Freedman, supra note 38, at
195-97.
150. 433 U.S. at 402 n.12.
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Such an advertisement is misleading in the first instance.
However, the lawyer may well escape liability for a
"misleading" advertisement under the present rule by claim-
ing that the service provided in a particular case was not
"routine." This situation under the present rules does not serve
the public's interest in accurate information on the one hand
and creates burdensome enforcement problems on the other.
The following more specific guideline would operate to reduce
both problems:
Unless otherwise specified in the advertisement: if a law-
yer publishes any fee information in a publication that is
published more frequently than one time per month, the law-
yer shall be bound by any representation made therein for a
period of not less than thirty days after such publication; if
a lawyer publishes any fee information in a publication that
is published once a month or less frequently, he shall be
bound by any representation made therein until the publica-
tion of the succeeding issue; if a lawyer publishes any fee
information in a publication which has no fixed date for pub-
lication of a succeeding issue, the lawyer shall be bound by
any representation made therein for a reasonable period of
time after publication, said period to be at least six months
long.
Unless otherwise specified, if a lawyer broadcasts any fee
information, the lawyer shall be bound by any representation
made therein for a period of not less than thirty days after
such broadcast. 51
It is submitted that this guideline will present little or no bur-
den to the advertising lawyer, who has the option of "specifying
otherwise" in the ad if he thinks it necessary or desirable to do
so. On the other hand, this proposal offers the public a specific
and enforceable safeguard against false or misleading price
advertising.
Even without changes, the interim rules are a significant
improvement over the prior rules. Electronic as well as print
media can now be used, thereby increasing the size of the target
audience. Consumers who require the services of a specialist'
are now more likely to locate lawyers who concentrate in the
appropriate area of the law. Moreover, public competition may
151. Adapted from House of Delegates, supra note 80, ABA Proposal A, DR 2-
101(F), DR 2.101(G), at 1235.
152. See text accompanying note 45 supra.
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make lower prices available to consumers. In short, the open
approach to lawyer advertising might well result in the greater
availability of legal services, with consequent economic benefit
to both the bar and the public through the fostering of free
enterprise. 53
CONCLUSION
This comment began with an allusion to the fact that the
controversy over lawyer advertising may be unwarranted. The
fears engendered by the Bates decision may well turn out to be
groundless in the face of experience under the new permissive
rules on lawyer advertising. Private conscience and peer pres-
sure' still constitute very significant constraints upon individ-
ual lawyers seeking to advertise. All that the Bates decision did
was to guarantee de jure first amendment protection to attor-
neys deciding to publicize the availability of their services.
The Bates decision was premised upon the assumption that
the vast majority of lawyers will choose to be honest and dis-
creet and will not abuse the newly acquired freedom to adver-
tise. Given this reasonable assumption the argument that blan-
ket prohibition of lawyer advertising is necessary to avoid bur-
densome enforcement problems falls of its own weight.
More fundamentally, however, the very concerns for profes-
sionalism and public service, which were responsible for the
adoption of anti-advertising rules in the first place, now call for
the abolition or modification of these once progressive rules.
Gone are the days when individual consumers of legal services
can be expected to acquire by word of mouth knowledge suffi-
cient to make informed decisions in the expanding and increas-
ingly sophisticated legal marketplace. Characteristically, the
new Wisconsin interim rules constitute a modern progressive
attempt to adapt the old tradition of professionalism to the
contemporary situation. Perhaps under the new rules on adver-
tising, with revisions as necessary,15" and with the aid of institu-
153. See CHRISTENSEN, supra note 20, at 137-40.
154. See Let Lawyers Advertise, U.S. NEws & WoRLD REPORT, Feb. 28, 1977, at 39
(where a proponent of increased lawyer advertising reports that several attorneys have
told her that "[p]rivately I'm with you, but I'd be hung if I said that in an open
meeting. My colleagues would have a fit.").
155. Cf. Kindregan, supra note 45. "[Ihe profession should not now be
stampeded into creating bad 'reforms' because of the admitted 'hard case' being pre-
sented against lawyers by consumer advocates." Id. at 42.
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tional advertising, referral services and legal service plans, the
bar will be able to fulfill its heretofore obscured duty of Canon
2 "to Make Legal Counsel Available."
THOMAS E. SKOWRONSKI
